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CORRECTION OF CITATION TO RECORD 
Appellant would first point out that all initial sites in Appellant's Brief to the record at 189 
are incorrect and the correct cite to this portion of the record should be to 377, the February 4, 1999 
hearing transcript. The internally referenced page and line numbers associated with the initial 
citation to R 189, however, remain correct, though, once again, this hearing is found at R 377 not 
R189. 
APPELLEE'S MISSTATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant finds herself compelled to respond to certain factual allegations asserted by the 
Appellee prior to addressing the issues and will do so as expeditiously as possible. 
1. At page 8 of Appellee's Brief, and throughout the brief thereafter, Appellee asserts 
that the parties were undertaking a joint venture to use Appellee's construction skills and the 
Appellant's equity to build two homes in an effort to build enough equity to own their own marital 
home free and clear. Appellee cites the following portions of the record as support of this position: 
(R.377, p. 11,11. 11-25 - p. 12,11. 1-6). The entire citation compromises statements of Appellee's 
counsel unsupported by any evidence or proffer of evidence in the record. Clearly, unstipulated 
statements of counsel are not a substitute for evidence and facts which must otherwise be apparent 
from the record. Subsequent Injury Fund v. Gallegos, 746 P.2d 71 (Colo. App. 1987): Durham v. 
Cessna Aircraft, 945 P.2d 8 (Kan. App. 1997). In the instant case, no evidence in support of 
Appellee's counsel's allegations was ever proffered or received. 
The record, however, contains a plethora of evidence wherein Appellant clearly maintained 
the separate property characteristic of her premarital assets. It is also interesting to note that the 
construction loan was not applied for until March of 1998, and the improvements made to the 
Diamond Valley Lot 19 did not occur until in April of 1998. This was but a few weeks prior to the 
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parties' separation. Even were the parties to have belatedly undertaken such a joint venture, the 
same would have terminated when the parties separated. Also, were Appellee's arguments sound, 
then why would those tools purchased during the marriage not be assets of the alleged joint venture 
and the increased obligation on Appellant's premarital home not an obligation of the joint venture? 
2. At page 10-12 of the Appellee's Brief, Appellee asserts that Appellant sold 
Appellee's premarital personal property and work tools despite an outstanding order that she not do 
so, that Appellee was unable to retrieve his personal property, and that he was unable to retrieve his 
business papers. However, Appellee received every item of personal property that Appellant had 
in her possession following the parties' separation with the exception of several items that were 
stolen from Appellant's son-in-law's home where the items were being stored. (R. 134, p. 16,11. 17-
25; R. 377, p. 31,11. 5-25, p. 32,11. 1 - 22; and p. 42,11. 15-23). Even prior to the issuance of the 
restraining order, Appellant sold nothing except one cement mixer, a sale which she was able to 
rescind, with the mixer being returned to the Appellee. Appellee repetitiously asserts that he did not 
receive his business papers and was prejudiced in presenting his case. See Appellee's Brief at pages 
12,16,21, 26, and 30. However, Appellee did receive his business papers on May 15, 1998 when 
he picked up his other personal items despite his continuous complaining that he had not received 
them. (R. 377, p. 44,11. 1- 3; R. 178, p. 31,11. 2- 9). If the Appellee felt he had not received all his 
business records then, he could have timely filed a motion to compel during discovery in this matter 
in the lower court. 
ARGUMENT 
Issue No. 1 
The Lower Court's Distribution Of Marital Assets 
And Debts Is Inequitable 
The final distribution of property and allocation of debts by the lower court awarded the 
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following assets acquired during the marriage and allocated the following debts incurred during the 
marriage to the parties as follows: 
1. Assets To Appellee: 
a. Winchester Hills Lot 127 - $55,000 
b. 1989 Ford Dually Truck - $9,500 
c. 1993 Ford Pickup - $3,500 
d. Wood burning stove - $ 1,200 
e. Saddle (as premarital) - $ 1,200 
f. Additional tools (as premarital) - $6,967.75 
2. Debts to Appellee: 
a. Mountain America Construction Debt - $ 11,000 
Net marital gain to Appellee of $66,367.75. 
3. Assets to Appellant: 
a. Diamond Valley Lot 19 (as premarital)- $45,000 
b. 1985 Ford Pickup-$3,500 
c. 1994 Ford Mercury - $6,000 
4. Debts to Appellant: 
a. Mortgage on home (as premarital) - $107,0001 
b. Credit Cards (as premarital) - $5,150 
Net marital loss to Appellant of $57,650. 
}The obligation on the Appellant's premarital home increased from $30,000 (R. 280) to 
$140,000 (R. 240; R. 323-325). The difference being $110,000. Of this amount $3,000 was 
used by the Appellant to pay off premarital credit cards (R. 291) and therefore the increase for 
obligations incurred during the marriage was only $107,000, which figure is used to obtain the 
net loss of $57,650. 
3 
The difference between the change in the parties position was therefore $124,017.75 and not the 
$48,700 Appellee asserts on page 14 of his brief. 
As set forth in Appellee's brief, the discrepancy between the parties' positions based upon 
the lower court's property award and debt allocation is not supported by the record. This Court 
should take note that this is especially true where the law of this case is that the parties' third divorce 
decree is res judicata as to any alleged inequities in property division and events prior to the parties' 
fourth marriage in August of 1995. Krambule v. Krambule. 994 P.2d 210 (Utah App. 1999); R 397 
Paragraph 5. Therefore, only this marriage which endured a total of 3 years and 7 months, during 
which the parties were separated 11 months is cognizable. Id As noted in the Appellant's Brief at 
pp. 23-25, despite the lower court's apparent stated adherence to the res judicata effect of the third 
divorce decree, the lower court went to great pains to remove Mr. Bowen from the perceived corner 
he was painted into due to the May 1995 "Quick-Court Kiosk" divorce. The judge, apparently 
believing that Mr. Bowen had been disadvantaged by this earlier decree, sought to right this situation 
by what is clearly an inequitable distribution in this fourth decree. See Appellant's Brief at 23-25. 
Appellee, to support the present inequity, alleges that his contributions to the marriage, 
Appellant's commingling of her separate property interests, and Appellee's enhancement to the value 
of the Appellant's premarital home justify the discrepancy in the lower court's award of assets and 
allocation of debts. Appellant will address each of the positions taken by the Appellee in turn. 
A. Exceptional Circumstances. 
As noted and not in dispute, the law of this case is that the third divorce decree had the effect 
of awarding Appellant her premarital home as a premarital asset to the fourth marriage by virtue of 
the Appellee not contesting that there were no assets to be divided in the parties third decree. 
Krambule v. Krambule. 994 P.2d 210 (Utah App. 1999) (R. 397, [^5; Appellee's Brief at p. 20) 
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It is also without question that if Appellee sought to challenge the results of the parties' third 
decree of divorce, he would have to do so by taking advantage of the lower court's continuing 
jurisdiction in that case and not in the case at hand! St. Pierre v. Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615 (Utah 
1982). Simply stated, although a district court has continuing jurisdiction over its decree in a divorce 
proceeding for alimony, support, and the division of property, a motion to modify the decree must 
be made in the original action and allege circumstances sufficient to warrant judicial review. Id, at 
617 citing Crofts v. Crofts 445 P.2d 701 (Utah 1968). This is a basic principle of subject matter 
jurisdiction, and alleged inequities by reason of the third decree are not jurisdictionally within the 
province of the trial judge in the fourth divorce action. 
B. Contribution. 
Appellee also claims that the lower court's award was equitable in light of his contribution 
during the marriage by bringing in the majority of the income, the Appellee's contributions during 
the marriage of $18,906.53 in maintenance, taxes, mortgage payments, and advertisements towards 
the Diamond Valley Home and $22,497.92 for household expenses and maintenance of Mrs. 
Bowen's premarital personal property, and the Appellant's lack of consistent substantial work. (See 
Appellee's Brief at p. 22). 
What Appellee fails to recognize and point out to this court is that the maintenance, taxes, 
mortgage payments, and advertisements did nothing whatsoever to increase the value of the 
Appellant's premarital home (R. 377, p. 21,11. 10-17; R. 238, 240)2, that Appellee made only 19 
mortgage payments during a 45 month marriage (R. 377, p. 18, 11. 16-22; R. 257-258), that the 
2The record at 238 and 240 are the refinancing documents and show that the first 
refinancing was for $80,000 in November of 1995 and that the amount due at the second 
refinancing in December of 1997 was over $80,000. The payments made simply paid for the 
interest. 
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Appellant made the other payments (R. 377, p. 18, 11. 13-25), that Appellant contributed to the 
marriage by working (R. 223,1. 21), that Appellant assisted Appellee in his construction jobs (R. 
377, p. 29 11 1-21; R. 323)\ performed all of the household chores (R. 377, p. 28,1. 12 to p. 29,1. 
5), sold premarital assets and used the proceeds for household expenses (R. 377, p. 19,11. 1-3 & 21-
22), and used her student loan monies for household expenses (R. 377, p. 19,11. 18-21), all of which 
contributed to the success of the marriage union. Furthermore, it cannot be gainsaid that Appellee 
benefitted from the use and habitation of his wife's premarital home during the marriage. 
Apparently Appellee believes that income and income alone is the sole contribution that a 
spouse can make to the success of a marriage. Said position is contrary to the law in the State of 
Utah. See Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990)("trial court abused its discretion when 
it justified an unequal and inequitable distribution of marital property based solely on the parties' 
economic contributions to the marriage." Dunn at 1322); See also Lee v. Lee. 744 P.2d 1378, 1381 
(Utah App. 1987). 
The Appellee also asserts without any support whatsoever in the record that the Appellant 
could not have acquired the loan to improve the two lots without the 
contributions made by Mr. Bowen. Mr. Bowen's contributions and 
improvements to the Diamond Valley house made it possible for Mrs. 
Bowen to refinance her home and acquire the two lots. (Appellee's 
Brief at 22-23). 
The record, however, is undisputed that Appellant was able to obtain the refinancings in her 
own name (R. 238, ), without even needing to show income simply based on her equity position in 
3The record at 323 is the loan application completed by the parties for the Mountain 
America Construction Loan. Therein, it is represented that Appellant had been employed by the 
Appellee for a period of two years and has monthly income of $1,200. This is what the parties 
apparently believed the contribution was to the Appellee's business. It is also noteworthy that 
the Appellee's business increased dramatically during the parties marriage as represented by his 
tax returns showing that his gross income increased from $30,087 in 1995 (R. 226), to $50,563 in 
1996 (R. 230), and $78,925 in 1997 (R. 235). 
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the premarital home (R. 239). The same was valued at $164,000 with an obligation of only $30,000 
at the time of the first refinance, November of 1995, and an obligation of only $80,000 at the time 
of the second refinance in December of 1997. The photographs used to support the appraisal for the 
November 1995 refinancing shows that the improvements were not in at the time of the refinance 
and the home appraised for $164,000 (R. 211, 221). 
C. Commingling. 
Appellee next claims that the lower court's award is equitable in light of the commingling 
on the part of the Appellant of her premarital assets. Appellee claims that Appellant commingled 
her separate property interest in the two lots that were purchased with proceeds traceable to her 
premarital home when Appellant quit claimed Diamond Valley Lot 19 and Winchester Hills Lot 127 
to herself and Appellee as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. 
What Appellee fails to mention is the fact that Appellant went to great lengths to retain the 
separate nature of the premarital home and the lots purchased with the proceeds from her 
refinancings of her premarital home. The undisputed evidence is that the refinancings of the 
Appellant's premarital home were in Appellant's name only (R. 238-239; R. 240-241; R. 377, p. 6, 
11. 11-16, that the proceeds were placed into Appellant's sole bank account (R. 238, 291; R. 240, 
319), and that the lots were purchased by Appellant and were conveyed only to Appellant. (R. 293-
301; R. 306-318) Appellee also neglects to point out or recognize that the only reason the lots were 
conveyed by Appellant to herself and Appellee was because the Appellant's initial application for 
the construction loan from Mountain America Credit Union was denied. However, Mountain 
America indicated that if the two lots were titled to both parties and the Appellee's name was 
included on the loan application, then the loan would be granted. (R. 377, p. 6,1. 15 to p. 7,1. 1; R. 
377, p. 16,1. 25 to p. 17,1. 2) Appellant therefore submitted a new loan application which included 
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the Appellee and quit claimed the lots on April 17,19984 as requested by the lending institution. (R. 
002, 323-325; R. 252) 
Clearly, there was no intent to commingle and the only reason Appellant's placed Appellee's 
name upon the lots that she had so carefully kept in her name alone was to pursue the construction 
loan that earlier had been denied her. 
Property does not lose its nature as separate property merely because it has changed in form. 
And, even if it has changed substantially in form, the issue is whether or not the property has lost its 
"identity" as separate property. See Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah App. 1990) and 
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer. 745 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1987). Here Mrs. Bowen's equity in the 
premarital home was converted to loan proceeds and from loan proceeds to the purchase of the two 
lots. The two lots purchased have not lost their separate identity, as the loan proceeds are directly 
traceable to their purchase. 
Appellee's reliance on Bradford v. Bradford. 993 P.2d 887, 892 (Utah App. 1999) is 
misplaced in that the court in Bradford found that a transfer coupled with a present intent to make 
a gift raises a presumption that the nature of the separate property would be changed to marital. In 
Bradford there was independent evidence of an intent on the part of Mr. Bradford to transfer a one-
half interest in his separate property to Mrs. Bradford when he conveyed his interest in the home to 
himself and Mrs. Elradford. Id, at 893. In this case, however, the evidence is to the contrary, as 
there was no intent to transfer on the part of Appellant other than to satisfy a financial institution's 
prerequisites for the issuance of a construction loan previously denied her. 
Similarly, the facts of Dunn v. Dunn. 802 P.2d 1314,1321 (Utah App. 1990) do not support 
4This was within two weeks of the parties separation in early May, 1998. Even if the 
intent was there the fact of the parties separation and the failure of the "joint venture" would tend 
to mitigate any commingling. 
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a change in character of the separate property interest that Appellant had in the lots. In Dunn, other 
than a small down payment traceable to separate property, the payments to the tune of $47,844 for 
an airplane were paid from marital income; with regard to the cars that were sold, the proceeds were 
placed into a joint account. Here, the premarital home was refinanced, the proceeds were placed into 
Appellant's separate account, the lots were purchased from the proceeds directly traceable to 
Appellant's separate account and titled in Appellant's name. Furthermore, Mr. Bowen's marital 
income paid less than half of the forty-five (45) monthly mortgage payments on Appellant's 
premarital home during the term of the marriage, and these were only payments of interest not 
principal. Again, these contributions are more than fully offset by Mr. Bowen's use and occupation 
of his wife's premarital residence. 
The case at hand is not unlike Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1990), where 
the court found that the separate property was not changed in nature due to a conveyance where there 
was no intention on the part of the wife to create a one-half property interest in the husband.5 
D. Enhancement. 
Appellee next argues that the discrepancy in the award of assets is justified because Appellee 
made significant contributions and improvements to Appellant's premarital home. Appellee argues 
that he made improvements worth $17,567, that he expended $18,806.53 in maintenance, taxes, 
mortgage payments, and advertisements on the home, and that he paid $22,497.94 of the household 
5
 This same argument goes to the 1989 Ford Dually, the 1993 Ford Pickup, the wood 
burning stove, the saddle, and the tools all purchased with proceeds traceable to the proceeds 
from the Appellant's refinancing of her premarital home. All are traceable to the loan proceeds 
which is a mere change in form of the Appellant's premarital home to loan proceeds to separate 
property purchased. The identity itself was not lost. 
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expenses. He also claims that he made $6,023.786 in improvements to Diamond Valley Lot 19 and 
$3,034 in improvements to Winchester Hills Lot 127. 
Despite Appellee's claim of $17,567 of improvements being made on Appellant's premarital 
home solely by Appellee's efforts, the clear weight of the evidence is that Appellant worked hand 
in hand with Appellee in making these improvements (R. 377, p. 20,11. 10-13; R. 377, p. 33,11. 6-
13), that Appellant's son-in-law assisted with the concrete and brick work (R. 377, p. 20,11. 10-13; 
R. 377, p. 33,11. 6-13), that the materials for the improvements were paid for by Appellant and/or 
that the parties collectively salvaged material from Appellee's jobs and, in the case of rock and 
gravel, that the parties gathered the same from the mountains and surrounding areas (R, 377, p. 20, 
11. 13-24; p. 18,11. 10-12), and that Appellant's assertions regarding the costs of the improvements 
were double what an independent licensed contractor, Mr. Hafen, would have charged. (R. 377, p. 
35,11. 1-13) 
The bulk of the items set forth in the Record at 257-260 are not improvements, but mortgage 
payments, insurance payments, advertising, water payments, etc. With respect to the house plans, 
Appellee retained the same as his separate premarital property. (R. 256; R. 360) 
E. Tax Lien. 
The tax lien is not a marital obligation and Appellant is therefore unsure why Appellee 
addresses said item under Issue No. 1, an equitable division of the parties' marital assets and 
obligations. Appellant has actually addressed this item in Issue No. 3, infra, the failure of the lower 
6The Appellee claim that he made $6,023.78 of improvements to the Diamond Valley Lot 
19 is not supported by his citation to R. 253 or R. 259-260. R. 253 is an invoice that the 
Appellee used to obtain a draw from the construction loan from Mountain America Credit Union, 
and therefore he did not contribute the same. The R. at 259-260 only supports a claim of $1,850 
and then $815 are for plans which the Appellee claimed were his separate property and were 
awarded to him as such. (R. 256, 360) 
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court to properly characterize the parties' separate property. 
Issue No, 2 
The Evidence Does Not Support The Lower 
Court's Sua Sponte Amendment To 
The Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law 
The issue here is not whether the lower court can make additional findings on its own 
initiative, but whether those additional findings are supported by the evidence. 
Without request, the lower court sua sponte amended its original findings of fact and 
conclusions of law entered on April 19, 1999, and changed the character of the Chase Credit Card 
debt, the Advanta Credit Card debt, and the Mountain America Credit Card debt, a total of $5,150, 
from marital obligations allocated to Appellee for repayment to premarital obligations of the 
Appellant. (See and compare R. 397-398 to R. 484-485)7 
It is the Appellant's position that the lower court erred in two respects: First, that the 
evidence was undisputed that any balances on said credit cards prior to the parties' marriage had 
been paid off by the proceeds from Appellant's refinancing her home in November of 1995 (R. 553, 
p. 5,11. 22-25, p. 6,11. 1-15, R. 291), that the obligations due at the time of the parties' divorce were 
incurred solely by Appellee (R. 553, p. 16,11. 12-15), during the parties' fourth marriage and only 
shortly before the parties separated (R. 553, p. 16,11. 12-13, p. 17,11. 9-16), that $2,150 of the $5,150 
7The lower court also changed the wood burning stove from a marital asset to a premarital 
asset of the Appellee despite the undisputed evidence that the wood burning stove was purchased 
during the marriage from proceeds traceable to the refinance of Appellant's premarital home. 
(Compare the initial Findings of Fact, R. 397-398 , to the Amended Findings of Fact, R. 484-
485) However, the lower court made an additional change and recharacterized the wood burning 
stove as marital but awarded it to Appellee anyway. See Order, R. 560-563. The lower court 
therefore did in fact fix the mistake of characterizing the wood burning stove as a premarital 
asset but made sure that the change had no result in the ultimate distribution by still awarding the 
wood burning stove to the Appellee and allocating the payment for the wood burning stove to the 
Appellant. 
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obligation were cash advances used by Appellee, and that the remaining items purchased were tools, 
materials and construction seminars which Appellee attended. (R. 332,345-346,347-349) Appellee 
does not dispute any of the above facts. Secondly, that because of the nature and timing of the 
expenditures, the only party who benefitted therefrom was Appellee and, therefore, the obligations 
should be deemed the separate obligations of Appellee as Appellant gained no benefit from 
Appellee's purchasing tools, attending construction seminars, and buying material, that occurred 
merely two weeks before the parties separated. 
Appellee now argues two points to support the lower court's sua sponte amendments: First, 
Appellee argues that reallocating the three credit card obligations to Appellant as her separate 
premarital obligations is supported by "evidence in the record that the charges on the three credit card 
debts went to improve the marital estate and the parties' joint venture." (See Appellee's Brief at p. 
29). Secondly, that even if the Court made an error in amending its findings of fact regarding 
changing the character of the three credit cards from marital obligations to be paid by Appellee to 
premarital obligations of the Appellant, the error is immaterial and harmless. (See Appellee's Brief 
at p. 29) Appellant will address each of these positions taken by Appellee in turn. 
A. Supported by Evidence. 
Appellee cites only to the Record at 553 (Transcript of February 3, 2000 hearing on the 
Appellant's Motion to Amend), without any reference to page or line numbers, to support his 
position that the charges on the three credit cards went to improve the marital estate and the parties' 
alleged joint venture. However, the Record at 553 contains no evidence whatsoever that supports 
Appellee's contentions and is merely argument of counsel at best supporting a finding that the 
obligations were incurred by Appellee during the parties' marriage. (R. 553, p. 16,11. 9-25, p. 17, 
11. 1-25) 
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What the record at 553 does support is the exact position the Appellee conceded, that is, that 
simply because he incurred the credit card obligations during the parties marriage the credit card 
obligations should be deemed marital obligations. See R. 553. 
The expenditures at issue for tools, construction seminars, cash advances, equipment rental, 
and materials were incurred by Appellee between 2-3-1998 to 4-22-1998. (R. 332, 335-346, 347-
349). Nowhere has Appellee produced any evidence that the tools, construction seminars, cash 
advances, equipment rental, or purchase of materials benefitted anyone other than himself. 
Appellee's attorney argued that the same were expenditures in furtherance of the parties' alleged 
joint venture. (R. 553, p. 17,11. 18-24). In light of the foregoing, the lower court's ruling that these 
obligations incurred solely by Mr. Bowen in the spring of 1998 were Appellant's premarital 
obligations is incredible, defies chronology, and is without evidentiary support. Indeed, the ruling 
defies any good faith assertion made by Appellee during trial and simply ignores both the nature of 
the expenditures and the calendar in use for two millennia. 
B. Classification is immaterial and harmless error. 
With regard to the immateriality and harmless error of the misclassification, the result is a 
$5,150 error with respect to the discrepancy between the parties' positions, and is neither immaterial 
nor harmless. 
Issue No. 3 
The Lower Court Failed To Properly Account For The 
Parties' Separate Property 
Both parties agree that their separate property should be awarded to the spouse who brought 
the same into the marriage and that the separate property may be included in the marital distribution 
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only if the separate property has lost its separate character. 
A. Assets traceable to separate property. 
As set forth in Issue No. 1, with regard to contributions, commingling, and enhancement, it 
is clear that Appellant's separate property, the equity in her premarital home, although changing in 
character to loan proceeds and then again to the assets purchased with the loan proceeds, did not lose 
its identity as separate property. 
Specifically, the undisputed evidence with regard to Winchester Hills Lot 1278, the saddle9, 
the wood burning stove, the 1989 Ford Dually Pickup, the 1993 Ford Pickup, is that the same were 
purchased with proceeds directly traceable to Appellant's refinancing of her premarital home. It is 
also undisputed thatt the loans were negotiated in Appellant's name only, the loan proceeds were 
deposited into Appellant's sole bank account, and the loan proceeds are directly traceable to the 
purchase of these assets. Despite this undisputed evidence, the lower court found the items 
purchased to be either marital or, with apologies to chronology, Mr. Bowen's premarital assets. 
Thereafter, though the court awarded Appellee a substantial portion of these purchased items, the 
court, incongruously allocated the entirety of the obligation incurred to purchase these assets as 
Appellant's premarital obligation. This inequity is, thus, not only oxymoronic, but, moreover, 
talismanic in its chronological transmutations. 
B. Tax lien. 
With regard to the tax lien, Appellee claims that there was insufficient evidence to base a 
8It is not disputed that the Appellee paid $2,900, $400 earnest money and a payment of 
$2,500, towards the purchase of Winchester Hills Lot 127. R. 260. 
9It is also not in dispute that the Appellant paid $1,200 towards the purchase of the saddle 
but that the saddle was worth $2,000. Appellee claims the $800 difference was a gift to him 
from his father. 
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ruling with respect to the existence of the tax liability and the probability that it would have an effect 
on the marital estate. Appellee's Brief at 27-28 relies on the lower court's ruling to this effect. Id. 
See also, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. 399. 
All Appellant seeks is what Appellee stipulated to at trial (R. 377, p. 13, 11. 13-21) and 
acknowledges even now in his appellee's brief, i.e., that the IRS Tax Lien is Appellee's separate 
obligation. (See Appellee's Brief at pp. 28 and 31; "Mrs. Bowen should not be allowed to deceive 
this court by placing the $43,000 tax lien into her liabilities with respects (sic) to the division of the 
marital estate when it is the separate property of Mr. Bowen and determined to be speculative at 
best.") Whether the same is speculative is not the issue and the tax lien being speculative is not 
supported by the evidence. 
The IRS Tax Lien in the amount of $43,329.58, as of November 16, 1998, existed and 
constitutes a serious encumbrance to title. (R. 350; R. 377, p. 17,1. 11) The parties had a sale of one 
of the lots during the proceedings to Richard Rogers and the title company discovered that the IRS 
was demanding payment of the $43,329,58 tax lien at the closing in addition to another $993 tax lien 
of Appellee. (R. 189, p. 5,11. 1-16, p. 6,11. 9-10) 
There is no deceit on the part of Appellant in requesting that the Appellee's separate 
premarital obligation, acknowledged as such by Appellee, be allocated to him as his separate 
premarital obligation. Furthermore, Appellant has not included the $43,329.58 in her calculation 
of the inequities of the lower court's $124,017.75 discrepancy of the award and allocation of the 
assets and debts acquired and incurred during the parties' marriage. The tax lien exists. Appellee 
acknowledges that it is his separate obligation, but now argues that the obligation is beyond the 
statute of limitations and is speculative. That argument goes to his defense of the IRS claim, but not 
to the proper characterization of the IRS tax lien as his separate premarital obligation in the divorce. 
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The lower court's should be charged with allocating this lien to Appellee, Mr. Bowen, as per his 
stipulation. Boyer v. Lignell, 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977). Thereafter, Appellee can resolve his 
premarital tax lien with the IRS without Appellant's continued involvement. 
Issue No. 4 
The Court's Refusal To Amend The Findings 
Is Not Consistent With The Evidence 
The Appellant's request is simple with respect to this issue. If indeed the parties had a joint 
venture, and the joint venture and marriage produced marital assets consisting of Winchester Hills 
Lot 127, the saddle, the wood burning stove, the 1989 Ford Dually, the 1993 Ford Pickup, the tools, 
should not the obligation concurrently incurred to purchase these "marital assets" consistently be 
deemed "marital debts" and allocated to the parties in an equitable fashion, i.e. that the party who 
received the marital asset be required to pay that portion of the marital debt? Is it simply the fact that 
the obligation is tied to the Appellant's premarital home that so confused the lower court? Surely, 
if the loans were from a different institution and under both parties names, and the proceeds were 
used to purchase the assets, the lower court would have equitably allocated that obligation. 
Appellant is presently paying the obligation on the only asset purchased during the marriage 
that she was awarded, Diamond Valley Lot 19, which was awarded to her as her premarital asset. 
Appellant is also paying the new obligation incurred during the marriage to purchase those assets 
awarded to Appellee as marital and several awarded to him as "premarital" in the case of the saddle 
and the tools purchased during the marriage. 
Again, either these assets should be deemed Appellant's separate property and she should pay 
the debt incurred to purchase the same, or the assets should be deemed marital and that portion of 
the newly financed obligation used to purchase the assets similarly allocated to the party to whom 
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the asset was awarded. That is equity in light of the facts of this case as established by the evidence 
presented herein, as distinguished from the casuistry continually espoused by Appellee. 
The $124,017,75 discrepancy in the parties respective position over a marriage of less than 
4 years cannot be upheld. 
Conclusion 
In the instant case, the lower court, absent subject matter jurisdiction, has attempted to right 
a perceived wrong from the consequences of an earlier pro se divorce. In so doing, the lower court 
has emaciated the principles of res judicata, disavowed modem chronology, and circumvented even 
the parties' own stipulations and arguments at trial. Thus, items purchased post marital are now pre-
marital when convenient, and credit card debts clearly post marital have somehow become pre-
marital and assigned to Appellant who never even incurred them post maritally. Consequently, 
despite the clear evidence, the lower court sua sponte created its own series of findings, neither pled 
nor argued by either party. Ultimately, in its alacrity to right the perceived wrong of the parties' third 
kiosk divorce, the lower court in the fourth divorce left Appellant with a $107,000 of new debt and 
an unwelcome tax lien of $43,000 as well as several credit card debts incurred solely by Appellee 
only weeks prior to the parties' separation, classifying the same as Appellant's pre-marital debt. The 
court's decree is, thus, not only legally violative of the doctrine of res judicata, but obviates the solar 
calendar relied on for two millennia and the prefixes "pre" and "post". Appellant, once again, 
requests that the Appellant Court reverse the decision with specific instructions to the lower court 
to equitably divide the assets and obligations of this, the fourth marriage between the parties and 
none other, and that the lower court do so in light of the evidence and the parties' stipulations in the 
record. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s ^ Z / day of February, 2001. 
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